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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STE?HEN SIMPSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 




STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for serious personal injuries sustain-
ed by the appellant while performing paint repairs on the 
tailgate assembly of a new Chevrolet station wagon. The 
incident occurred in the paint shop of the Capitol Chevro-
let Company in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury which returned a general 
verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, 
no cause of action. Judgment on the verdict was entered, 
and plaintiff made a motion for a new trial, which was 
thereafter denied. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment in 
the court below and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Stephen Simpson was 26 years of age, who 
had worked as an automobile painter since he was 15 
years old (R. 292, 295 ). He started working for Capitol 
Chevrolet Company in June of 1961. He was required to 
obtain his own tools, consisting of a small ratchet set, a 
couple of screwdrivers, a pair of pliers, etc. (R. 298). It 
was a frequent, usual and customary part of his work to 
use these tools in order to remove things in the area he was 
required to paint. On December 9 he was assigned the 
painting of a damaged tailgate on a 1966 Chevrolet station 
wagon. He noticed that the tailgate had been burned quite 
badly where it had been spot welded, and the removal of 
the safety straps (elsewhere in the record called support 
arms) was essential to his doing a good job. In order to 
remove the support arms he just had to take out three 
screws with a screwdriver (R. 302-304). He removed all 
but one screw and called for a coworker, Ray Ure, to 
hold onto the other side of the tailgate so that they could 
gently lower it. He then removed the third screw and 
proceeded to let the tailgate down (R. 304, 305). As the 
tailgate was being lowered, Ray Ure suddenly said, 
"Watch out for that torque bar," and when appellant 
looked to see what he was talking about, he got hit in the 
head. He was taken to the hospital where he was uncon· 
sc10us for about three days (R. 307, 308). 
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Tht: witness Ure testified that he had no idea what 
!n.poen if the torque rod came out of the sleeve 
which was holding it, he simply thought there might be 
some problem in getting it back into position. He had no 
understanding as to what problem it might create (R. 
21.2-214). 
The appellant likewise did not know what the func-
tion of the torque rod was, although he knew it had 
to do with the movement of the tailgate. The 
function of the torque rod had never been explained to 
b'm by anyone (R. 306). On previous occasions he had 
nken off the support arms and dropped the tailgate on 
older models, and he did not know the rod would come 
out, or what would happen if it did. He was intending to 
lrlw':r the tailgate down, paint the inside, put the straps 
on, then shut the tailgate and do the outside (R. 327). 
He didn't know there was any spring tension there. He 
had lowered tailgates before where the bumper would 
prevent the rod from coming out of its bracket (R. 332). 
Even if the rod dropped through the guide did not mean 
th:i.t it would flip out. Even if it came out, it might fall 
the other way or it could just stand there stationary, for 
all the witness then knew (R. 334, 335). The appellant 
further testified that he did not know that the rod would 
come out of the sleeve at the time of the accident, no 
matter how the tailgate was lowered (R. 336). Appellant 
was not trying to remove the tailgate altogether, nor to 
disconnect it from the hinges. He planned on letting it 
down just a little bit so that he could do his painting (R. 
14(l). Appellant did not know what the name of the 
3 
torque bar was until after the accident. He considered the 
springs or the hinges themselves would operate as the 
spring like on a storm door (R. 348). 
Dr. Wayne S. Brown, professor of engineering at the 
University of Utah, testified that he had performed ex-
periments on the same model station wagon and photo-
graphs were taken during these experiments which were 
received in evidence as exhibits P-1 - 8 inclusive. He testi-
fied that when the tailgate was lowered a little bit below 
the horizontal position, the rod came out (R. 132, 133). 
The witness testified that the torque rod travelled at a 
speed equivalent to 47 miles per hour, which would be 
similar to the velocity achieved by dropping a piece of 
metal from a height of a six story building (R. 136). Dr. 
Brown described simple inexpensive procedures by which 
the operation of the tailgate could be obviated without 
impairing function (R. 141, 143). Even to him as a highly 
trained engineer, the torque rod's operation was not com-
pletely obvious. He had carefully watched the torque rod 
operating during the experiments, and it was not until he 
analyzed the photographs later that he got a clear picture 
of what was really happening-and this was because the 
hinge itself moves while the tailgate is moving, and so 
the relative motion has to be determined with some refer-
ence to the fixed part of the automobile (R. 166). 
Charles J. Griswold, the engineer in charge of the 
Fisher Body Division of General Motors Corporation testi-
fied that a similar torque rod design had been in use 
since 1962 on over two million vehicles (R. 221, 232). 
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Pc st;ited that if the support straps were moved with the 
bumper in place, the torque rod would already be out be-
fore the tailgate touched the bumper (R. 243). He testified 
that when the torque rod in question was designed, one 
c(,nci.::rn that they had was that someone would open the 
[:ire ccmpletely and go after those two screws supporting 
rhc rnrquc ro<l with the gate open (R. 259). He admitted 
,;,:.t -':: no tin:c did they conduct any experiment to see 
v·i1··t '' ould h;lpT'en if the torque rod all the way 
.:'!Ol!c':';h the rc::iiner. He stated, "We didn't run experi-
rw-···•s o!- t'.1at n:'.rure. Something like that is hazardous, to 
c{ l'b'.'r;1tel" put tb'.':t thing down. You are running all 
l: »d; '. .. r.:s:.:s .... " He that the tailgate does 
ncr hn c to drop all the way dcwn in order for the torque 
t(, es::ar;c '\':ith :::1e si<le supports down, "And that's a 
:·i:,i1ly <langercus tl1ing, if that hap?ens. If it comes out, 
is no qul'stion about it" (R. 260, 261). The witness 
.:drnirtcd that he would not expect a person without 
s;'.:cid experience as an engineer or as a service mechanic 
:·,Jr Genenl Motors to know that the rod was a torque 
rod just by looking at it, and he further testified that a 
'"ithou:: experience as an engineer or ser-
' ice mechar..ic would not be aware that if the rod came 
its retainer with the tailgate at 35 ° that the rod 
\\ ould fly toward him at a dangerous rate of speed, and he 
J;d not think the average owner of a General Motors 
station Y>agon since 1962 would be aware of these things 
(R. 266). The witness admitted that on several occasions 
while rhe Court would recess he would lock up the tail-
gate on Exhibit 19 so that someone could not operate or 
with it (R. 275 ). 
The respondent offen:.:J into eYic.knce a service manu:.d 
and a page from the manual as exhibils 17 and 18. These 
exhibits were admitted over the objection of the api)eilant 
until it was first sho\vn th;:t rhe manual ::nd ics contents 
had been brought to attention of the appdlant in conncc. 
t!on with his work (R. 159). Tl-:e appellant excepted to 
the question that if the procedure prescribc<l by the 
manual had been followed no danger would have been 
involved (R. 162). Over appellant's objection, counsel for 
the respondent was permitted to read the instructions in 
the manual with respect to the removal of the uilgate 
assembly (R. 174, 175, 176). Again, over the objection 
of the appellant, counsel for respondent was permitted 
to read from the manual, exhibit D-18, the instructions 
for the removal of the tailgate, even though appellant's 
counsel specifically pointed out there was never any <'!-
tempt or intention to remove the tailgate, he was simply 
endeavoring to lower it (R. 177, 178, 179). When th<.: 
body shop foreman was asked if he expected a paimcr Lo 
come from the paint shop and consult the manual in the 
rerformance of his work as a painter, he answered th:H 
a painter wouldn't particularly need the manual (R. 190). 
and he could not even remember how many years :<go ir 
was that a painter came out of the shop to look at a 
manual (R. 191). During the several years that he had 
worked at Capitol Chevrolet, at no time was the ;:ppellanr 
given any instruction with respect to the use of .1 
Motors Fisher Body Manu'.1!. No Dody :\Iarnd 
\Vas ever kept in the paint shop <R. 298). He ack.nm•:-
ledged that painters frequently rem()\:ed m!>'ding .1 
G 
car, sometimes a mam part, sometimes an ornament, or 
maybe even a safety strap (R. 186, 187). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENT WAS STRICTLY 
LIABLE FOR PLACING UPON THE MAR-
KET A ST A TION WAGON EQUIPPED 
WITH A TAILGATE ASSEMBLY THAT 
WAS DANGEROUSLY DEFECTIVE IN DE-
SIGN AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
IS NOT A DEFENSE IN STRICT LIABILITY 
SITU A TIO NS. 
This case involves a tailgate assembly which was 
inherently defective and dangerous in its design. The 
d;i.nger was hidden and not perceptible, even to a highly 
trained engineer, much less to the appellant who was 
a painter. Every time the tailgate on any of the General 
Motors station wagons is lowered a short distance below 
the horizontal position, the torque rod will escape from 
iLs retainer and fly forward at a highly dangerous rate 
of speed. It is a serious threat of injury or death to the 
unsuspecting, and it was acknowledged as highly danger-
ous by the engineer in charge of the Fisher Body Division 
of General Motors Corporation, who testified that a simi-
lar torque ro<l design had been in use since 1962 on over 
two million station wagons (R. 260, 261, 262, 266). 
We respectfully refer the Court to Section 402A Re-
statement of Torts 2d. Special liability of seller of product 
for physical harm to user or consumer. 
-I 
" { 1) One who sells any product in a defective con-
dition, unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate 
consumer or to his property, if (a) the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such a product, 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the con-
dition in which it is sold. 
"(2) The rule state in subsection ( 1) applies al-
though (a) the seller has exercised all possible 
care in preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller .... 
"Comment 
"(N) Contributory Negligence. Since the liability 
with which this section deals is not based upon 
negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the 
rule applied to strict liabi liry cases (see Section 
524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff is not a defense when such negligence consists 
of a mere failure to discover the defect in the 
product or to guard against the possibility of its 
existence. On the other hand, the form of con-
tributory negliy,ence which consists in voluntaril\' 
and unreasonably proceeding to encounl"er J 
known danger, and commonly passes under the 
name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this 
section as in other cases of strict liabilitv. If the 
user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware 
of the danger and nevertheless proceeds unreason-
able to make use of the product and is injured by 
it, he is barred from recovery." 
See also Prosser 011 Torts 2d Ed P _)41: 
8 
"It frequently is said that the contributory negli-
?Cnce of the plaintiff is not a defense in cases of 
strict liability .... At the same time the defense 
which in negligence cases is called assumption of 
risk, will, in genera!, relieve the defendant of strict 
liibility. Here as elsewhere, the plaintiff will not 
be heard to complain of a risk which he has en-
countered voluntarily or brought upon himself 
with full knowledge and appreciation of danger." 
See lllso Dillard C:r fl(irt, Product Liability a11d Duty 
to W'"anz. 41 V2. Law Review 145, 163 (1955): 
"To ho!d these defenses is to divulge in circular 
re'.lsoning, since the plaintiff cannot be said to 
have assumed a risk of which he was ignorant and 
to have contributed to his own injury when he 
had no way of reasonably ascertaining that the 
danger of injury existed." 
See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Re-
ports 896, _)91 P2d 168. In that case the hydraulic brake 
svstem of a new Ford failed after 1,500 miles and the 
plaintiff was seriously injured. 
At page 898 in the C(fl. Reports the Court said: 
··in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 
Cal. 2<l 57, 62, 27 Cal. Rptr 697, 700, 377 P2d 897, 
900, we held that 'A manufacturer is strictly liable 
in tort when an article he places on the market 
knowing that it is to be used without inspection 
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes in-
jury to human beings ... 'since Ford as the manu-
facturer of the complained product cannot dele-
gate its duty to have its cars delivered to the ulti-
mate purchaser free from dangerous defects, it 
cannot escape liability on the ground that the de-
feet in Vandermark's car may have been caused 
by something one of its authorized dealers did or 
failed to do." 
In the case, Curry 1·. Fred Olsen Line, _1167 F2<l 921 
( 1966), 928, the Court said: 
"The general rule is that contributory negligence 
is a defense only to actions grounded on negli-
gence and the California courts apply this prin-
ciple, thus they have held that contributory negli-
gence is not a defense to an intentional tort .... 
Similarly the California courts have held contribu-
tory negligence is not a defense in certain types 
of actions bottomed upon strict liabi Ii ty." 
See also Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co. (Ind). _i,r 
F.Supp. 427 ( 1965) which involved a defective forklift 
truck. The Court cited with approval Section .J02A of the 
Restatement of Torts and stated at page 429: 
"Neither did contributory negligence constitute a 
defense although use different from or more stren-
uous than that contemplated to be safe by ordinary 
users/consumers, that is 'a misuse' would either 
refute a defective condition or causation." 
Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., CC.A. 6 
278 F2d 254, 258: 
"Negligence on the part of the buyer would not 
operate as a defense to the breach of If 
the manufacturer chooses to extend the scope of 
his liability by certifying certain qualities as ex-
istent, the negligent acts of the buyer, bringing 
about the revelation that the qualities do not 
exist, would not defeat As Justice Butzel 
said in the Bahlman case, there is neither 'reason 
nor authority' for introducing the defense of con· 
JO 
tributory negligence into an action for breach of 
warranty." 
The case of ]arnot v. Ford Motor Co., Pa. 156 A.2d 
568, involved a defective king pin in the steering mecha-
nism of a tractor which broke while the driver was 
negotiating a curve. The Court held: 
"The question of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence does not arise here in an action of assump-
sit on a contract as it does on trespass for personal 
injuries .... Under the facts in this case the plain-
tiff cannot be barred in the application of that 
principle." 
The case of Schneider v. Shurman, S Utah 2d 35, 327 
P2d 822 recognizes the following principle: 
"Plaintiff based his claim of negligence against 
the supplier upon the doctrine, of which we do not 
doubt the correctness, that the supplier of his com-
modity directly or through a third person is sub-
ject to liability to those who he ordinarily expects 
to use it, if the supplier (a) knows of its potential 
danger, (b) knows or reasonably should know that 
the user will not realize the danger, and (c) the 
supplier fails to use reasonable care to safeguard 
against the danger or to inform the user of the 
facts which makes it dangerous." 
ln the case at bar it rnnnot be seriously disputed that 
rhe <1rr<1ngcmcnt of the t<:!ilgate assembly was highly 
and that the <hnger would not be discernible 
to a person not famili:ir with the function and 
br:h<1vior of the torque rod when the tailgate is lowered 
beyond the horizontal position. It was easily forseeable 
h · che designers and assemblers of the General Motors 
11 
sutivn wagons that perso:is not es_?ecially trained or 
skilled in the or function of the tailgate assem-
bly would have occasion to lower the t::iilgate beyond the 
horizontal position for purposes of painting or repair, 
or even in the normal use of the vehicle, and yet they al-
together failed to take the simple a11d inexpensi vc al-
ternatives that were available to them which, if used. 
vrnuld have eliminated the threat of bodi!y harm and 10-
jury inherent in the design. 
Reason, common sense, and the principles of justice 
all combin.: in holding the manufacturer strictly liable 
in situations of this kind. As the emir..ent Justice Cardozo 
remarked in the case of Palsgraf 1·. Long Islrmd Railroad. 
248 NY 349, 162 NE 99: 
"The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the 
duty to be obeyed." 
The same rule applies to the behavior of the appel-
lant in this case. It would be foolish to hold him responsi-
ble for the consequences of an inherent danger unknown 
to him. This would require an extension of the duty ro 
be obeyed far beyond the risk reasonably to be perceived. 
The appellant should not have been required to take 
measures to protect himself against a danger which was 
not reasonably apparent to him. The record is completely 
devoid of any evidence that would show that the appel-
lant knew or should have known of the risk involved in 
removing the third screw from the support um and 
lowering the tailgate. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE DEFENSE OF CONTRIB-
UTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE AVAILABLE 
IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD BASE A 
FINDING OF CONTRIBUTORY NE G L I -
GENCE AND THAT ISSUE SHOULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
Realizing at the conclusion of the case that the de-
fendant had altogether failed to prove that the appellant 
was guilty of any conduct which would constitute con-
tributory negligence, the appellant asked the Court in its 
requested instruction No. 8 to remove this issue from the 
case (R. 51 ). Appellant duly accepted to the Court's re-
fusal to grant this request. 
A review of the Statement of Facts set forth above 
will conclusively show that appellant was carefully pur-
suing his assigned duty to paint the damaged tailgate; 
that he had no awareness of the function of the torque 
rod or of what would happen if it escaped from its sleeve. 
l !:: did not know there was any tension there. He had 
lowered tailgates before without experiencing any danger. 
The professor of engineering testified that even though 
he had carefully 'vatched the torque rod operating during 
rhe several experiments performed by him that it was 
not until he later analyzed the photographs that he got 
a clear picture of what was really happening. The re-
spondent's engineer, Charles J. Griswold, who was chiefly 
responsible for the adoption of the dangerous tailgate 
d::sign, acknowledged that it was highly dangerous (R . 
. 2(>0, 2GI ), and admitted that he would not expect a per-
13 
son without special experience as an engrneer or as a 
service mechanic for General Motors to know the sig-
nificance of the torque rod operation or to be aware that 
if the tailgate were lowered beyond -1> 5 degrees that the 
rod would escape from its retainer and fly at a dangerous 
rate of speed (R. 266). There was no warning of any kind 
upon the vehicle itself and no instructions concerning the 
mechanical operation of the tailgate were ever given tu 
the appellant. There is nothing in the record to show 
either that he was aware of any danger or that he had a 
duty to inform himself so that he could avoid it. The rec-
ord fails to disclose any unreasonable conduct on his part, 
unless thoroughness in the performance of his work could 
be so construed. The appellant felt that the removal of 
the support arm was essential to his performance of a 
first class job in the painting restoration of the tailgate 
on a new station wagon. 
Although appellant's counsel realizes that contribu-
tory negligence is ordinarily a jury question. It becomes 
a matter for the Court when no evidence is adduced upon 
which a finding of contributory negligence could be based. 
To submit this unsupported issue to the jury was highly 
prejudicial. Indeed, it is difficult to otherwise explain the 
jury's verdict. 
In Northwestern Airlines, Inc. 1·. Glenn L. Martin 
Co., CC.A. (6), 224 F2d 120, the lawsuit involved a d<:-
fective design in an airplane wing. We quote from that 
case at page 120: 
"In short we believe that there is a complete ab-
sence of any evidence that Northwestern at any 
1-1 
rJme prior to August 29, 1948 had knowledge or 
ap?reciation of any risk or danger associated with 
the the material, the workmanship or the 
tests of the faulty wing joints in the 202 airplanes. 
There is no evidence that the danger lurking in 
the wing joint was obvious to those Northwestern 
representatives who actually did observe it that 
they must be taken to have appreciated the danger. 
We conclude that it was error to submit to the jury 
the questions of Martin's assumption of risk in this 
case." 
Again from the same case at page 127: 
"It is conceded by Martin that 'if Northwestern 
had simply relied on Martin to produce a safe and 
sound airplane and had taken no further interest 
in the material, there would be no issue here of 
contributory net;ligence'. That, in any event, seems 
to be the law. One need not anticipate the negli-
gence of another until he becomes aware of such 
negligence .... It is not contributory negligence 
to fail to look out for danger when there is no 
reason to apprehend any (citing cases) .... One to 
whom a duty is owed has a right to assume that 
it will be performed. He is not required to antici-
pate negligent acts or omissions on the part of 
others ( citing cases)." 
Again in Styers t'. lr7 imto11 Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
(0:. C.) 80 :'E 2d 25_1, 2-19 N.C. 504 it was held as a matter 
c:f law that there no contributory negligence involved 
·,, he11 rhc phintiff w;<s ir.jurcd in the explosion of a Coca-
( :ola bott!::. 
also nrou I.' I'. Cha/J!Jltlll, _104 F2d 1-+9, 
I CC.A. <)) where the follmving language appears: 
"Orn: may well rely upon a warranty as protection 
the aggravation of the consequences of 
1;) 
ones own carelessness ant1C1pating that one may 
negligently drop tobacco ash upon one's clothing. 
One may well rely upon a wuranty that such 
clothing is made from suitable fabric \vhich does 
not possess extraordin:uy characteristics of flam-
mability and accordingly will not burs: into flame 
as the result of such act of carelessness." 
in Bahl111a11 t', Motor Car Co., 290 
Mich. 683, 288 NW 309, involved the purchase of an auto-
mobile reli:rnce upon the manufacturer's represen-
tation that it had a unisteel top. The purchaser was in 
an accident and his was gashed on a seam where 
two pieces of steel had been welded together. H<.: re-
covered for breach of warranty even though it was his 
negligcrce that Gwsed the automDbile to overturn. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING IN 
EVIDENCE THE FISHER BODY SERVICE 
MANUAL (EXHIBITS 17 AND 18) AND IN 
ALLOWING TESTIMONY WITH RESPECT 
TO ITS CONTENTS TO BE GIVEN TO THE 
JURY. 
The appellant was not required to use or follow the 
service manual in the performance of his work as a 
painter, and it was error for the Court to receive the 
manual in evidence 2nd testimony concerning it. 
It was not negligence for appellant to fail to use or 
follow the manwd in performing his work in this case, 
for the following re;i.sons: Tbe service manual itself J'.J 
net contain any word of warning or cauiion referring to 
Hi 
the hidden danger involved in the tailgate assembly, or 
fhe to be incurred in the removal of the support arm. 
The service manual was kept in the office of the body 
shop manager (R. S 1 ), and the appellant was never at 
any time instructed to use the manual nor was there a 
bo<ly manual in the paint shop where he worked (R. 297, 
298). No instructions were ever given to employees in 
the paint shop regarding the use of the manual (R. 190). 
The body shop foreman said, "As a painter, he wouldn't 
particularly need the manual" (R. 190, 191). The body 
shop foreman didn't even know within years when a 
painter last came in the body shop to ask for the manual 
(R. 191 ). The body shop foreman testified that the screw-
driver was standard equipment for painters (R. 182) and 
that painters frequently removed moldings from a car, 
sometimes a main part, sometimes an ornament, or maybe 
e'.en a safety strap (R. 186, 187). Finally, it would not 
be reasonable to expect a painter working on a commis-
sion basis, to go around the body shop looking for a 
manual to tell him how to remove three screws so that 
he could sand and paint underneath the support arm, 
when nothing in his training or experience gave any hint 
as to any possible risk or danger in the operation in so 
proceeding. 
The Trial Court, over the objection of the 
allowed counsel for the respondent to read instructions 
in the manual with respect to the removal of the tailgate 
a'>sembly (R. 174, 175, 176) even though appellant's 
counsel specifically pointed out that there was never any 
attempt or intention on the part of the appellant to re-
move the tailgate-he was simply endeavoring to lower 
it (R. 177, 178, 179). 
These errors with respect to the introduction into 
evidence of the service manual were highly prejudicial. 
The jury might very well have attached to the manual 
and the procedures outlined therein significance beyond 
that to which they were entitled, and they may have con-
sidered this a breach of duty when the duty itself did not 
exist, the manual and its contents not having ever been 
brought to the appellant's attention or his compliance 
with it required, or even recommended or expected by his 
superiors. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 16. 
In instruction No. 16 the jury was told that an 
automobile manufacturer is not liable for injuries result-
ing when an automobile is used in a manner it was not 
entitled to be used, that merely because a product can be 
used dangerously or because a user can be subjected to a 
danger does not make the product itself dangerous, if 
it would not be so while being used as intended, and that 
a is not required to foresee all possible ways 
i!l which a person may injure himself nor to protect 
against all such possibilities or against misuse by careless 
persons (R. 70). 
Appellant excepted to the giving of this instruction 
for the reason th<J.t it was misleading in failing to include 
]8 
in the use of the automobile the reasonably to be antici-
pated repairs of the automobile. The jury may very well 
have concluded under the instruction of the Court that 
there was no duty to protect the appellant in the perform-
ance of his work as a painter on the vehicle as distinguish-
ed from its general use. The instruction is even more ob-
jectionable in view of the fact that it refers to "misuse by 
careless persons" which would carry with it the implica-
tion that the appellant was careless. If, as Justice Cardozo 
observed, the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the 
duty to be obeyed," the manufacturer would not even be 
excused by an unintended or abnormal use, although it 
would require a considerable stretch of the normal mean-
ing of words to consider the painting or repair of a 
vehicle as an unintended or abnormal use. The test is 
not the intended use, but the forseeable risk. The enlight-
ened trend of recent case law is to permit the jury to 
determine whether certain unintended uses should be 
anticipated as within the scope of foreseeable risk. See 
flaherly z·. Reardon Co., 319 S. W. 2d 859 (Mo. 1958) 
wht:-re a boy lost his eye which came in contact with drip-
ping paint brush in father's hand. The Court held that 
if the jury found the chemicals were strong enough to 
cause blindness, manufacturer owed duty to warn. In 
Spruill i·. Boyle-Midiray, Inc .. 308 F2d 79, a 14 month 
oid child died from ingestion of defendant's furniture 
polish. There was a duty to warn of foreseeable abnormal 
use. See also Victory Sparkler Co. 1·. Latimer, 53 F2d 3, 
where it was held foreseeable that children would eat 
the type of fireworks called devils" because of color 
and appe:Hance, and there are numerous other cases. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS 
INSTRUCTION 18. 
In instruction No. 18 tl:c Court told the jury that if 
the phintiff v.·as negligent then his recovery would be 
barred. Of course, as pointed out under Point I, it was 
error for the Court to instruct the jury on contributory 
negligence, but this instruction was especially objection-
able because the Court provided no guide whatsoever for 
the jury with respect to what would or would not con-
stitute contributory negligence in this particular case on 
the part of the appellant. 
Kassouf t'. Lee Bros. Inc .. 26 Cal Rptr 276. In that 
case the Court refused an instruction to the effect that it 
was incumbent upon the plaintiff to take reasonable 
precautions for her own safety in the handling, inspection 
and consumption of the candy bar at isssue and that a 
failure on her part to meet such duty proximately con-
tributing to her injury, if any, would defeat her right of 
recovery even though the jury might find there was a 
breach of warranty on the part of the defendants. The 
Court said: 
"Instruction No. 20 may be dealt with rather sum-
marily. It contains no definition of the degree of 
care which the profferor claims to be required of 
plaintiff. Is it ordinary care? Slight care? What is 
meant by 'reasonable precautions'? Besides, we 
deem it to be in outright error in its postulate that 
precautions must be used in the 'handling' and 
'inspection' of the candy bar. This would include 
presumably a duty to look before biting into the 
bar and perhaps to feel the bar before eating. We 
believe there is no such duty. One can fancy the 
consternation among packaged candy makers and 
sellers if a statute were proposed which would re-
quire labels on candy bars warning the buyers to 
look before eating because worms or vermicular 
eggs might be present .... 
"This brings us to the question whether fault of 
the plaintiff is a defense in a food warranty case. 
Fault of the plaintiff in the form of assumption 
of risk was not pleaded by the defendants and it 
is the law that it must be pleaded specifically un-
less it appears from the facts alleged in the com-
plaint or unless the case has been tried as if the 
case had been pleaded .... 
"It is our decision that contributory negligence 
would not be a defense. This issue, unlike that of 
assumption of risk, actually was raised by plead-
ing and by manner in which the case was tried." 
Sec also Adams i·. Parish, 189 Ky 628, 225 SW 467. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and authorities set forth in this 
brief, the appellant respectfully urges this Court to re-
verse the judgment of the Trial Court and grant to the 
appellant a new trial in the furtherance of justice and 
right. 
Respeccfully submitced, this 15th day of January, 
1970. 
WOODROW D. WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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